JAKARTA – It began as the sort of remark that might once have passed with little notice: Speculative, lightly delivered and aimed at a domestic audience. But, within hours, a comment on April 22 by Indonesian Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa about charging ships a toll to pass through the straits of Malacca and Singapore triggered swift responses from its closest neighbours and forced Jakarta into a public clarification.
For much of April 23, analysts and officials were trying to figure out: Is Indonesia really considering the radical idea of levying one of the world’s busiest sea lanes, or had one minister made remarks never intended as policy?
By April 24, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono had drawn a firm line under the matter. The country, he said, remained committed to international law and freedom of navigation, adding that it was not in a position to impose such charges.
Few observers that The Straits Times spoke to believed Indonesia was seriously preparing to impose a toll on ships using the waterway, but the episode quickly grew into something far larger than a dispute over transit fees.
It exposed differing voices inside the government, highlighted how quickly casual remarks can become diplomatic signals, and revived a familiar question in Jakarta: When multiple ministers speak, whose words count?
As one former Indonesian official put it privately, noting how remarks made publicly now travel quickly worldwide in a time of heightened geopolitical sensitivity and faster information flows: “Every statement becomes a global issue.”
The controversy began after Dr Purbaya, speaking in Jakarta on April 22 at a financial symposium attended by a mostly local audience, referred to Indonesia’s position astride a major global trade and energy route.
“We are on a strategic global trade and energy route, but we do not charge ships passing through the Strait of Malacca,” he said.
He then referred to Iran’s reported plans to charge vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz amid heightened tensions in the Middle East.
“If we split it three ways between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, that could be quite something, right?” he added with a laugh.
Outside Indonesia, the reaction was more serious.
The straits of Malacca and Singapore are not peripheral waterways. They are among the world’s central maritime arteries, linking East Asia with Europe, the Middle East and Africa. More than 200 vessels pass through daily, carrying oil, raw materials, manufactured goods and food.
Observers and officials said remarks that might sound casual in a domestic setting could easily be interpreted abroad as policy signals. Some Indonesian ministers were still adapting to the reality that comments now crossed borders instantly, amplified by online media and higher geopolitical sensitivity.
Dr Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have long viewed the Strait of Malacca less through dominance than stewardship.
Since the early 2000s, especially after the Malacca Straits Patrol was established by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and later Thailand, the littoral states have maintained that policing the waterways is their responsibility, while outside partners may assist through funding, training, information sharing and capacity building.
The arrangement helps preserve national sovereignty while allowing practical cooperation with external users and partners.
Unlike the Strait of Hormuz, Dr Koh said, the Malacca Strait has benefited from decades of practical cooperation among its coastal states.
“Asserting dominance beyond what is considered necessary jurisdiction and control per legal norms over the Malacca Strait could in fact potentially backfire, including inviting the spectre of foreign intervention,” he said.
If Dr Purbaya’s comments created uncertainty, the speed of the correction was equally telling.
Mr Kris Mada, a research fellow at Indonesia Strategic and Defence Studies, said the remarks were better understood as comments made at an economic forum by a minister under pressure over state revenues, rather than evidence of a planned policy shift.
The swift clarification by Mr Sugiono mattered because, on questions involving diplomacy, maritime law and relations with neighbouring states, the Foreign Ministry was more likely to reflect Jakarta’s formal position, he said.
For Indonesia, that legal order is not abstract. Its archipelagic status is recognised under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), making support for the convention closely aligned with Indonesia’s national interests.
“Should Indonesia deny UNCLOS, Indonesia will lose international legal base for its archipelagic status,” Mr Mada said.
That helps explain why Mr Sugiono’s response was more than a routine clarification. It was also a reaffirmation of a longstanding strategic interest.
Yet, the remarks did not emerge from nowhere.
Mr Mada said some Indonesians have long complained that the country has not fully benefited economically from the Strait of Malacca, while still bearing costs linked to smuggling, pollution, piracy and other illicit activity.
He added that any serious disruption to the route would have consequences far beyond the region, as goods moving between East and South-east Asia and markets in Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and southern Europe depend heavily on passage through the strait.
“The blockade of (the) Malacca Strait will make the blockade of (the) Hormuz Strait like amateur work,” he said.
Associate Professor Yohanes Sulaiman of Jenderal Achmad Yani University in West Java said the proposal was unlikely to be a formal government plan but may have been an attempt to “test the waters” amid fiscal pressures, including subsidy burdens and revenue constraints.
The government has budgeted around 210 trillion rupiah (S$15.5 billion) for energy subsidies in 2026, highlighting the fiscal burden from fuel, electricity and liquefied petroleum gas support.
“Indonesia’s budget is in a difficult position, so there may be some trial balloons to see what is politically feasible,” Prof Yohanes said.
While the remarks were widely seen as unserious, he said they could also have been intended to gauge reactions. “It seems that the consensus now is that he is joking while giving those remarks, but the problem in Indonesia is that serious political discussion is so limited nowadays,” he added.
Similarly, earlier in April, Indonesia was reportedly considering granting broader overflight access to US military aircraft, which sparked questions over sovereignty and alignment. Officials later downplayed the proposal as a preliminary idea with no binding effect.
“Essentially, (the government seems to be) testing policies that may not be facing massive public pushback and (then) go with it should the pushback be few, and they can easily disown the proposed policies should the pushback be severe,” Prof Yohanes said.
On April 22, the same day the toll idea was suggested, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan said no country could unilaterally determine access to the strait.
He said Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand shared a “watertight understanding” on the status of the 900km waterway.
“Whatever is to be done in the Strait of Malacca must involve the cooperation of all four countries. That is our understanding – it cannot be done unilaterally,” he said.
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan was even more explicit.
“The right of transit passage is guaranteed for everyone,” he said at a CNBC event in Singapore. “We will not participate in any attempts to close or interdict or to impose tolls in our neighbourhood.”
Current and former Indonesian officials privately described Dr Purbaya’s remarks as an unnecessary source of confusion rather than a serious policy proposal.
Speaking separately on condition of anonymity, they said the suggestion that ships could be charged to pass through the Strait of Malacca did not reflect any established Indonesian position.
One official said the comments “did not represent Indonesia’s position”, while another suggested the episode raised broader questions about coordination within government.
Ministries were reportedly not always aligned before making public statements on issues related to diplomacy and national strategy. One official described agencies as operating in silos, leading to ambiguity about Indonesia’s true stance.
They also said the controversy should not be mistaken for a change in maritime policy or any reconsideration of Indonesia’s longstanding support for international law. Rather, they saw it as a communications lapse that raised unnecessary concern from neighbours.
Mr Pieter Pandie, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, said the episode “indicates poor inter-ministerial coordination on foreign policy”.
Dr Broto Wardoyo, a senior assistant professor of international relations at the University of Indonesia, offered a more tempered reading.
The foreign and finance ministries naturally had different priorities, he said, and differing public remarks are part of normal institutional dynamics in a democratic system.
On issues involving maritime law and diplomacy, however, the more authoritative position would come from the relevant minister, in this case, Mr Sugiono or the coordinating minister for political and security affairs, he said. He added that the finance minister had no authority over such matters, and that neighbouring concerns were understandable but had been addressed by Mr Sugiono’s clarification.
Former Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa told ST that Indonesia’s position on maritime law should remain clear, noting that the country has long played an active role in shaping and upholding UNCLOS, which he said is “beyond important”.
Indonesia has not only supported the agreement’s provisions, but also played an active role in shaping them, said Dr Marty, who served as foreign minister from 2009 to 2014.
“We have been steadfast and persistent in building state practice in its support, including with Malaysia and Singapore as fellow littoral states in the straits of Malacca and Singapore,” he said.
“Any suggestion to the contrary would have no place in Indonesia’s policy practice. More than ever, it is vital that Indonesia’s principled policy be made crystal clear.”
